Review of \u3cem\u3eA Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam\u3c/em\u3e by Womack, L. Olivia
Tenor of Our Times
Volume 8 Article 16
2019
Review of A Better War: The Unexamined Victories
and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam
L. Olivia Womack
Harding University, olivia.womack13@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.harding.edu/tenor
Part of the History Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the College
of Arts & Humanities at Scholar Works at Harding. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Tenor of Our Times by an authorized editor of Scholar Works
at Harding. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@harding.edu.
Footer Logo
Recommended Citation
Womack, L. Olivia ( 2019) "Review of A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam,"
Tenor of Our Times: Vol. 8, Article 16.
Available at: https://scholarworks.harding.edu/tenor/vol8/iss1/16
 
123 
 
A BETTER WAR: THE UNEXAMINED VICTORIES AND FINAL 
TRAGEDY OF AMERICA’S LAST YEARS IN VIETNAM 
 
By L. Olivia Womack
 
In his exploratory book, A Better War, Lewis Sorley compares 
the nature of the Vietnam War under General Creighton Abrams to his 
to his predecessor, General William Westmoreland, arguing that, ‘a 
better war’ was possible under the full direction of Abrams. From the 
beginning of his command in 1964 until 1968, the strategy used by 
Westmoreland had been primarily attrition warfare with ‘search and 
destroy’ missions and large-scale unit operations. Westmoreland 
focused on body count as a measure of the war, and repeatedly asked 
Congress for more troops. Abrams replaced Westmoreland after the Tet 
Offensive in 1968, and quickly enacted a contrasting war strategy. 
Abrams’ ‘One War’ strategy focused equally on smaller unit ‘clear and 
hold’ missions, pacification efforts in rural South Vietnam, and the 
reinforcement of the South Vietnamese Army.1 It became clear that 
Abrams “demonstrated his understanding of the true nature of the war” 
through this strategy.2 Sorley proposes that Abrams’ strategy was more 
effective and could have led to a victory for South Vietnam if that 
strategy had been employed from the start of the war. In fact, Sorley 
argues that by 1971 the South Vietnamese and American troops were 
essentially winning the war under Abrams’ strategies. However, 
declining public opinion and waning political support in the United 
States led to the untimely withdrawal of U.S. troops and, ultimately, the 
collapse of South Vietnam.  
The ‘better war thesis’ is the core of Sorley’s work. It is a 
compelling argument that a winning outcome for South Vietnam was 
                                                 
1 Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final 
Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Inc, 1999), 
8-9. 
2 Ibid., 18. 
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possible, if only the strategy of General Abrams had been followed 
from the start. Sorley’s thesis adds to the ever-expanding body of 
scholarship on the Vietnam War. By exploring the later years of the 
war, Sorley analyzes a part of the war that had been previously 
overlooked. Sorley has written four books on the later years of 
Vietnam, greatly contributing the body of scholarship about this time 
period, especially regarding the comparison of the strategies of 
Westmoreland and Abrams. These works include Thunderbolt: General 
Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, and Westmoreland: The 
General Who Lost Vietnam. In his Acknowledgments, Sorley describes 
how he painstakingly collected the new and previously classified 
information that makes up the bulk of his work. As a veteran himself, 
Sorley used his military connection to gain access to what he calls 
“Abrams’ Special Collection,”: 455 tape recordings from U.S. Military 
Headquarters in Vietnam during the time of Abrams’ command.3 This 
newly found primary source has illuminated the leadership of Abrams 
and influenced the way historians view this complex war. Most 
importantly, his analysis provides an original argument about the war’s 
end.  
A Better War and Sorley’s historical thesis have changed the way 
many view the later years of the Vietnam War. Sorley’s arguments are 
persuasive and “seductive,” as one reviewer states.4 However, under 
closer inspection, it seems that Sorley’s analysis is idealistic and 
overreaching at times. Many reviews dispute Sorley’s claim that a 
better war was possible under Abrams. Gentile, in his review in The 
National Interest, contends that the Vietnam War was never actually 
winnable based on the costs Americans were willing to pay in blood 
                                                 
3 Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final 
Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Inc, 1999), 
390.  
4 Gian P. Gentile, "The Better War That Never Was," The National 
Interest 118 (2012): 90.  
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and treasure.5 Another review maintains that Sorley “ultimately does 
not convince” historians that, had Abrams been the General for the 
entire war, South Vietnam would have prevailed.6  Not only have 
scholars disagreed with Sorley’s thesis, but recent published works 
refute some of his key points. In an article for The Journal of Military 
History, Andrew Birtle rebuts the claim that Abrams’ tactics in Vietnam 
were more effective. Sorley claimed that a 1965 study of the progress 
in Vietnam had disagreed with Westmoreland’s ‘search and destroy’ 
tactics and thus revealed a need for Abrams’ new strategy. Birtle 
demonstrates that this 1965 study actually did the opposite as it 
conclusively supported Westmoreland’s tactics.7 Additionally, Graham 
Cosmas argues that there were more similarities than differences 
between the tactics of Westmoreland and Abrams.8  
Despite the criticisms and rebuttals, A Better War made a major 
contribution to the study of the later years of the Vietnam War and the 
leadership of General Abrams. Sorley persuasively argues that there 
could have been a better war in Vietnam if only Abrams had been in 
charge from the beginning. Sorley conveys that under Abrams, the U.S. 
and South Vietnamese forces had victory in sight, yet public support in 
the United States forced the withdrawal of U.S. troops that preceded the 
fall of South Vietnam. Whether a historian agrees with this thesis or 
not, most can agree that Sorley’s work has added greatly to the 
scholarship and has renewed the discussion of Vietnam War’s severe 
complexity.
                                                 
5 Ibid, 90. 
6 William J. Duiker, “Book Reviews,” The Journal of American History 
87, no. 2 (2000): 747-49.   
7 Andrew J. Birtle, "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: a 
Reappraisal," The Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 (2008): 1213-1247.  
8 Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of 
Escalation, 1962–1967,  
(Washington DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2006). 
  
